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LABOR RELATIONS 
AND TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE 
WENONA T. SINGEL' 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 28, 2004, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or "the 
Board") reversed thirty years of precedent when it applied a new test to 
determine whether the San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, a tribally-
owned casino located on reservation land, was subject to the NLRB' s 
jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).I Until the 
Board issued its opinion, tribes were able to conduct their affairs on 
reservation lands knowing that labor concerns were governed by tribal law, 
without interference from the federal government. Now, on-reservation 
tribal activities are no longer immune from the purview of federal labor 
law, and tribes are forced to regroup and determine whether the Board's 
confusing and subjective test will subject their activities to the NLRA. 
The application of the NLRA to tribes is also significant because it 
marks the growing application of the judicially-created Tuscarora-Coeur 
d'Alene approach.2 This hybrid analytical framework has never been 
reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, yet six courts of appeals and 
the NLRB have adopted it to support determinations that federal employ-
ment statutes of general applicability apply to Indian tribes, unless the law 
"touches exclusive rights of self-government in purely intramural matters" 
or would abrogate treaty rights, or unless there is proof in the legislative 
history that Congress did not intend the law to apply to tribes) 
'Visiting Assistant Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law. Appellate Judge 
and Member, Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians. J.D., Harvard Law School; A.B., 
Harvard College. Thank you to Tiffany Johnson, Katrina Turman, Doug Murch, and Marah 
DeMeule of the North Dakota Law Review for their assistance. I also wish to thank Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher for his constant encouragement. 
I. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB No. 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at * I (May 
28,2004). 
2. See generally William Buffalo & Kevin J. Wadzinski, Application of Federal and State 
Labor and Employment Laws to Indian Tribal Employers, 25 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 1365, 1379 
(1995) (describing the creation of the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene approach, citing Federal Power 
Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960), and Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene 
Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
3. See EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Housing Auth., 260 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2001); Fla. Paraplegic 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126 (II th Cir. 1999); Reich v. 
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & 
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[n opposition to these courts of appeals, the Tenth Circuit applies an 
analysis rooted in recognition of tribal inherent sovereignty and reserved 
rights.4 Under this analysis, the court acknowledges Congress's plenary 
power over Indian affairs, yet refrains from concluding that a statute works 
as a divestment of tribal sovereignty unless Congress has clearly expressed 
an intent to do SO.5 
The difference in these competing modes of analysis represents a 
fundamental conflict in how the courts construe tribal sovereignty. For 
some, the hallmark of sovereignty is its inherent nature, and any 
diminishment of sovereignty or abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity 
requires an explicit expression of Congress, with ambiguities construed 
against the backdrop of the Indian canon of construction.6 For others, the 
hallmark of sovereignty is the doctrine of implicit divestiture'? From this 
approach, the courts are untethered from the foundational principles of 
federal Indian law and Congressional statements on Indian sovereignty and 
are free to make their own assessments of whether sovereignty is consistent 
with particularized circumstances. 
This article argues that the San Manuel decision and the Tuscarora-
Coeur d'Alene line of cases adopt the wrong approach to determine whether 
federal statutes of general applicability that are silent as to tribes effectively 
divest tribes of their sovereign powers. Part I describes the Board's 
decision in the San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino matter. Part II 
discusses how the Board's analysis departs from the foundational principles 
of federal Indian law, the Indian canon of construction, and even the 
Supreme Court's developing implicit divestiture doctrine, leading the Board 
to apply an overly-restrictive, subjective test that minimizes sovereignty 
and ignores congressional policy. Part III describes the NLRA and argues 
that Congress did not intend for it to divest tribes of their sovereign powers. 
Part IV proposes strategies that tribes can adopt to continue to assert tribal 
sovereignty in labor relations. 
Const. Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929 (7th 
Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Navajo Tribe, 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
4. E.g .. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186 (lOth Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
5. See id. at 1195. 
6. See generally Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the 
Indian Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1,5-7 (1995). 
7. Id. 
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I. THE DECISION TO ASSERT JURISDICTION OVER THE SAN 
MANUEL 
693 
The San Manuel Band of Serrano Mission Indians is a federally 
recognized Indian tribe with a reservation located in San Bernardino 
County, California.8 The Tribe owns a 100,000 square-foot gaming opera-
tion on reservation lands and employs over 1,700 Indian and non-Indian 
employees at the facility.9 The facility provides an essential stream of reve-
nues, all of which are used to fund government services such as water and 
sewer, road construction, educational services, housing, and job training. 10 
On June 28, 2003, the Tribe entered into a collective bargaining 
agreement with Communication Workers of America (CWA) pursuant to an 
employee election held in accordance with the Tribe's labor relations 
ordinance. I I The agreement governed employment matters such as wages, 
seniority, vacation time, sick leave, holidays, grievances, training, and 
health and safety matters,12 
In 1998 and 1999, separate complaints were filed with the NLRB 
against the Tribe's casino alleging that the casino violated the NLRA by 
rendering aid, assistance, and support to the CW A by allowing CW A agents 
access to the casino facility while denying similar access to agents of 
another union, the Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International 
Union (HERE).13 The tribe moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 
arguing that NLRA did not govern its on-reservation activities,14 
The Board held that the NLRA applied to the Tribe's gaming opera-
tions, and as a result, it concluded that it did indeed have jurisdiction to 
review the merits of the compiainLI5 The Board reached its conclusion in 
two steps. First, it reassessed earlier NLRB precedent that had established 
that Tribes and their enterprises were exempt from the NLRA's definition 
of employer. 16 Section 2(2) of the NLRA provides that the definition of 
"employer" does not include "[t]he United States or any wholly owned 
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any state or 
political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor 
8. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138,2004 WL 1283584, at * I (May 28, 
2004). 
9. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians website, Economic Diversification, at 
http:www.sanmanuel-nsn.gov/economic.php (last visited Feb. 12,2005). 
10. San Manuel, 2004 WL 1283584, at * 11 (Schaumber, dissenting). 
II. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians website, supra note 9. 
12. Id. 
13. San Manuel, 2004 WL 1283584, at *1. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at *3. 
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Act. .. or any labor organization (other than when acting as an 
employer), ... "17 In earlier cases, the Board had concluded that tribal 
enterprises operating on reservation lands were "governmental entities" that 
qualified as "political subdivisions" and were therefore excluded from the 
definition of "employer."ls The Board justified its reversal by explaining 
that the text of the NLRA never supported an exemption for tribal 
enterprises, but the Board had been willing to apply the exemption to Tribes 
by analogizing them to the NLRA's reference to political subdivisions of 
States.l9 In San Manuel, the Board emphasized that, in its opinion, this 
analogy was not only unsupported by Supreme Court precedent,20 but also 
counter to the principle that exceptions to the NLRA must be narrowly 
construed.21 
The Board then reviewed whether "federal Indian policy" provided a 
basis for exempting the casino from the NLRA.22 Here the Board's rea-
soning represents a fundamental shift in its theory of tribal sovereignty 
under federal law. Prior to San Manuel, the Board had affirmed that tribes 
are free from outside intervention unless specifically authorized by Con-
gress. For example, in Fort Apache it had pronounced that "[ilt is clear that 
individual Indians and Indian tribal governments, at least on reservation 
lands, are generally free from state or even in most instances Federal 
intervention, unless Congress has specifically provided to the contrary."23 
With San Manuel, the Board adopted a completely contrary rationale. This 
rationale begins from the premise that all federal statutes of general 
application are presumed to apply to Indian tribes unless the statute touches 
a tribe's exclusive rights of self-government in purely intramural affairs, 
17. 29 U.S.c. § 152(2) (1998). 
18. See Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 NLRB 503 (1976) (Fort Apache) (finding that tribal 
mining company located on Indian land was a "governmental entity" and therefore not an 
employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act); see also S. Indian Health Council, 290 
NLRB 436 (1988) (Southern Indian) (holding that a nonprofit health care clinic operated on a 
reservation and the consortium of seven Indian tribes that operated the clinic were "governmental 
entities" excluded from the definition of "employer" under the NLRA). 
19. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138,2004 WL 1283584, at *4 (May 28, 
2004). 
20. Id. at *6; see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980); 
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899,905 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 
grounds Big Hom County Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000); Smart v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 936 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Barquin, 799 F.2d 619, 621 
(10th Cir. 1986). 
21. San Manuel, 2004 WL 1283584, at * I; see also L.A. County Museum of Art v. NLRB, 
688 F.2d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1982). 
22. San Manuel, 2004 WL 1283584, at *7. 
23. Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 NLRB at 506. 
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abrogates a treaty right, or can be deemed to exempt tribes on the basis of 
the act's language or legislative history.24 
The Board relied on the Supreme Court's 1960 decision in Federal 
Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation25 for the premise that 
statutes of "general application" apply to the conduct and operations of 
Indian tribes.26 In Tuscarora, the Court held that the Federal Power Act 
(FPA) applied to Indian land as well as non-Indian land, thereby allowing 
the Tuscarora Indian Nation's land to be taken for a hydroelectric power 
project,27 In its analysis, the Court stated, "a general statute in terms 
applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests."28 
In support of its reliance on Tuscarora as authority for San Manuel, the 
Board points to a line of cases from the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals that have used Tuscarora as the starting 
point for determining whether other federal employment laws apply to 
tribal activities. 29 Notably, however, each of the circuits that have relied on 
Tuscarora in the federal employment context have found that the opinion's 
blanket statement regarding general statutes and their application to Indians 
conflicts with other established principles of federal Indian law. Rather 
than dispense with using the case as precedent for extending federal 
employment statutes to tribal employers, however, these courts have 
identified three exceptions to the rule.3o 
The Ninth Circuit first identified three exceptions to Tuscarora's rule 
in United States v. Farris.3] That case involved the application of a federal 
criminal statute to individual tribal members. In 1985, the Ninth Circuit 
reiterated these three exceptions in a case involving the application of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act to a tribally-owned farm. In this 
opinion, Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm,32 the court observed that 
statutes of general applicability should not be applied to the conduct of 
24. San Manuel, 2004 WL 1283584, at *7-*8. 
25. 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
26. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 116 (1960). 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. See Fla. Paraplegic, Ass'n. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1129-
30 (11th Cir. 1999) (ADA); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 
1996) (OSHA); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 1989) (ERISA); 
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985) (Coeur d'Alene) 
(OSHA). 
30. [d. 
31. 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the provision of Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970 proscribing gaming applied to individual Puyallup tribal members operating a 
casino on reservation land). 
32. 751 F.2d I 113 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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Indian tribes if (1) the law "touches exclusive rights of self-government in 
purely intramural matters," (2) the application of the law would abrogate 
treaty rights, or (3) there is "proof' in the statutory language or legislative 
history that Congress did not intend the law to apply to Indian tribes)3 The 
general premise made in Tuscarora's holding as modified by Coeur 
d'Alene's recognition of three exceptions has since been referred to as the 
Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene approach. 
Though this is the first time the Board has applied the Tuscarora- . 
Coeur d'Alene approach to a tribe's on-reservation conduct, the Board is no 
stranger to this line of cases. Prior to San Manuel, the Board applied 
Tuscarora and Coeur d'Alene to off-reservation tribal activities.34 This 
practice began twelve years earlier in Sac & Fox, when the Board reviewed 
whether the NLRA applied to an off-reservation tribal manufacturing 
business.35 The Board determined in Sac & Fox that the Fort Apache and 
Southern Indian precedents were distinguishable because in those cases, the 
Board stressed that the tribal activity in question was occurring on 
reservation land)6 In such on-reservation instances, the Board found that 
the assertion of jurisdiction "would interfere with the tribes' powers of 
internal sovereignty."37 With Sac & Fox's off-reservation operation, the 
Board concluded that the conduct was distinguishable and therefore did not 
qualify under the "political subdivision" exemption from the NLRA.38 
Once the Board freed Sac & Fox's conduct from the "political subdivision" 
exemption, it applied Tuscarora and Coeur d'Alene and concluded that the 
Board had jurisdiction over the activity)9 
Applying Tuscarora-Coeur D'Alene to San Manuel, the Board 
determined that there was no barrier to the assertion of jurisdiction.40 The 
Board held that the NLRA is a statute of general applicability, and that none 
of the exceptions provided in Coeur d'Alene applied.41 It found that no 
treaty would be abrogated by assertion of jurisdiction under the NLRA and 
no legislative history existed that indicated that Congress intended to 
33. Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115; see also Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d at 177; 
Smart, 868 F.2d at 932-933. 
34. Sac and Fox Industries, Ltd., 307 NLRB 241 (1992). 
35. Id. at 242. 
36. Id. at 242-43. 
37. Id. (citing Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 NLRB 503,505-06 (1976) and S. Indian Health 
Council, 290 NLRB 436, 437 (1988)) . 
38. Id. at 245. 
39. Id. at 242-43. 
40. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138,2004 WL 1283584, at *9 (May 28, 
2004). 
41. Id. 
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exclude tribes from the NLRA's application.42 The Board also considered 
whether assertion of jurisdiction would "touch exclusive rights of self-
governance in purely intramural matters," and it concluded that it would 
not.43 It held that "intramural matters" include matters such as "tribal 
membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations."44 It distinguished 
such matters from the casino, which it described as "a typical commercial 
enterprise operating in, and substantially affecting, interstate commerce ... 
[with] employees [who] are not members of the tribe."45 As a result, the 
Board concluded that "the tribe's operation of the casino is not an exercise 
of self-governance,"46 and it therefore did not fit into Coeur d'Alene's first 
exception making it subject to the Act. 
II. THE BOARD'S DEPARTURE FROM SUPREME COURT 
PRECEDENT 
A. THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE FOUNDATIONAL TENETS 
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
The Board's decision that the NLRA applies to the San Manuel Band's 
on-reservation casino operation is problematic for several reasons. At the 
outset, the decision fails to recognize the foundational principles of federal 
Indian law, and as a result, its analysis is unmoored from a deeply-rooted 
judicial tradition that affords a certain respect for tribal self-government and 
defers to the exercise of congressional power. 
The Board's analysis does open with a quote from Felix Cohen, that 
"Indian tribes consistently have been recognized ... by the United States as 
'distinct, independent political communities' qualified to exercise powers of 
self-government, not by virtue of any delegation of powers, but rather by 
reason of their original tribal sovereignty. "47 The Board also quotes the 
Supreme Court's decision in McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of 
Arizona48 for the principle that tribal sovereignty predates that of the 
Federal government.49 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at * 14. 
47. Id. at *3 (quoting FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERALINDIAN LAW, 232 (1982}). 
48. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
49. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138,2004 WL 1283584, at *3 (May 28, 
2004) 
(citing McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172). 
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The Board's nod to Felix Cohen omits several important principles that 
describe the place of Indian tribes in the federal system. These principles, 
first articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in the Marshall trilogy,50 are 
derived from the nation's historic relationship with Indian tribes and the 
references made to tribes in the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution.51 The cases of the Marshall trilogy are widely recognized as 
insightful descriptions of the Framers' understanding of the relationship 
between the federal government and Indian tribes because their author, 
Justice Marshall, w~s a contemporary of the Framers of the Constitution 
and was knowledgeable of the debates regarding the status of Indian 
tribes. 52 
In the first case of the Marshall trilogy, Johnson v. McIntosh,53 Justice 
Marshall concluded that upon "discovery," the rights of Indian tribes to 
complete sovereignty were "necessarily diminished,"54 and that the tribes 
had lost their capacity to make treaties or enter into land transactions with 
any sovereign other than the discovering nation.55 In Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia,56 Marshall explained that although tribes were not equivalent to 
foreign nations, the Cherokee Nation remained "as a state, as a distinct 
political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs 
and governing itself."57 Tribes are "domestic dependent nations,"58 and 
their relationship to the United States "resembles that of a ward to its 
guardian. "59 
In the third case of the trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia,60 Marshall 
affirmed that the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution vested 
sole authority to manage Indian affairs in the Congress.61 Congress's 
power in this arena precluded the assertion of state authority over Indian 
50. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 
(5 Pet.) I (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
51. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce 
"with the Indian Tribes," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3. 
52. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit o/States' Rights, 
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 270 (2001); see also 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,70 (1996) (describing Chief Justice John Marshall along 
with Madison and Hamilton as "three influential Framers"). 
53. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1832). 
54. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574. 
55. Id. at 573. 
56. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831). 
57. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16. 
58.ld.atI7. 
59. Id. 
60. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
61. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 538. 
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tribes.62 Furthermore, Congress's authority to manage Indian affairs was 
not aimed at the destruction of tribal sovereignty.63 Rather, the relationship 
between the tribes and the federal government was "that of a nation claim-
ing and receiving the protection of one more powerful: not that of indivi-
duals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the 
laws of a master."64 
Marshall's references to Congress's power to manage Indian affairs 
and his references to the guardian-ward relationship between tribes and the 
United States became the Supreme Court's first articulation of the plenary 
power doctrine and the federal trust responsibility. Marshall also under-
stood that the political authority of Indian tribes is an inherent sovereignty 
predating the United States.65 He also explained that treaties between the 
federal government and Indian tribes served to cede pre-existing tribal 
rights and expressly retain others.66 Marshall's analysis of the Cherokee 
Nation's treaties with the United States also led him to explain that unless 
Congress acted through legislation or the executive entered into a treaty, 
tribes retained their inherent sovereign rights.67 
The Marshall trilogy ultimately gave rise to the Indian canon of 
construction. The Indian canon is an approach to the interpretation of 
treaties and statutes affecting Indian rights that gives special consideration 
for the retained rights and inherent sovereignty of tribes and for the trust 
relationship between tribes and the federal government.68 In County of 
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation,69 the Supreme 
62. Id. at 561. 
63. See id. at 555. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 559 (describing the Indian nations as "distinct, independent political communities, 
retaining their natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial"). 
Id. 
66. Id. at 553-54. 
67. Id. at 561. According to Marshall, 
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with 
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and 
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the 
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with acts of Congress. 
68. David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction. Stare Decisis and Dependent Indian 
Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 37,41 (1999) (noting that 
Worcester v. Georgia is generally accepted as the genesis of the canons of construction for federal 
Indian law); see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) ("ltJhe 
canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in the unique trust relationship between 
the United States and the Indians"); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 
(1980) ("traditional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our 
jurisprudence that they have provided an important 'backdrop' against which vague or ambiguous 
federal enactments must always be measured") (citation omitted). 
69. 502 U.S. 251 (1992). 
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Court stated that "[w]hen we are faced with ... two possible constructions 
[of a statute], our choice between them must be dictated by a principle 
deeply rooted in [the United States Supreme] Court's Indian jurisprudence: 
'[s]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of Indians, with ambiguous 
provisions interpreted to their benefit. "'70 This canon of construction has 
been applied in several cases to prevent ambiguous statutes from creating 
an implied diminishment of tribal rights.?l The Indian canon of construc-
tion also counsels that tribal self-governance rights should be upheld unless 
Congress has made its intent to abridge them "unmistakably clear."72 
Over time, the principles established in Marshall's opinions have been 
repeatedly cited as guideposts in the field of Indian law.?3 Through the 
mid-1980s, the cases were consistently invoked.?4 Although today's 
Supreme Court rarely recites the Marshall cases, they have not been over-
ruled,75 and their presence and affirmation in nearly 150 years of decisions 
has left an indelible mark on Indian law jurisprudence.76 Similarly, 
although the canons of construction have played a less prominent role in the 
Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence,77 they have not been overruled and 
continue to provide critical elements of Indian law opinions.78 
70. Yaki17Ul Nation, 502 U.S. at 269 (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759,766 
(1985». 
71. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 
373 (l976); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941) (finding that statute 
creating Colorado River Reservation did not extinguish tribe's aboriginal title and rights to 
ancestral lands); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665,675-76,678 (l912). 
72. COHEN, supra note 47, at 283 ("congressional intent to override particular Indian rights 
[must] be clear"); see also Yakima Nation,502 U.S. at 258 ("[O]ur cases reveal a consistent 
practice of declining to find that Congress has authorized state taxation unless it has 'made its 
intention to do so unmistakably clear. "') (citation omitted); California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 n.17 (I987); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 
U.S. 226, 247-48 (l985). 
73. Getches, supra note 52, at 272. 
74. [d. at 272. 
75. But see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (noting that the Court has long 
departed from the notion in Worcester v. Georgia that "the laws of [a State] can have no force" 
within reservation boundaries). 
76. [d. at 274. 
77. Judith V. Royster, Of Surplus Lands and Landfills: The Case of the Yankton Sioux, 43 
S.D. L. REV. 283, 307 (l998) ("The Court will recite the canons, state that they apply, and then 
interpret the treaty or statute at issue to find that no ambiguity exists."). In Chickasaw Nation v. 
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 (2001), the Court also determined that the canon that assumes 
Congress intends its statutes to benefit the Indian tribes may be offset by the canon that warns 
against interpreting statutes as providing tax exemptions unless those exemptions are clearly 
expressed. 
78. Pourier v. S.D. Dept. of Revenue, 658 N.W.2d 395, 399 (S.D. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. 
Ct. 2400 (2004) (affirming that the Indian canon forms the necessary background to consideration 
of whether the Hayden-Cartwright Act permits state tax of on-reservation fuel sales from Indian-
owned corporation to tribal members). 
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In stark contrast to an approach that recognizes that the foundational 
principles of federal Indian law have actual legal import, the Board in San 
Manuel depicts federal Indian law as a policy that it may choose to apply or 
ignore.79 The Board's description of the legal status of tribes within the 
federal system as a "policy" rather than "law" is a pernicious attempt to 
diminish the legal status of Indian tribes to a mere value of the "legal 
culture" that should be weighed against competing values.8o Policies do not 
mandate legal outcomes, they merely articulate broad goals. 
The Board also does more than simply mischaracterize federal Indian 
law as a "policy." To the extent its analysis hinges on "policy," it has the 
policy wrong. The Board's discussion of federal Indian policy is limited to 
a selective reference to federal case law and a statement that tribal commer-
cial activities do not implicate the special attributes of tribal sovereignty.8) 
Neither of the principle cases addressed by the Board affirm past or present 
congressional statements of federal Indian policy.82 Similarly, Congress 
has never pronounced a policy that tribal sovereignty does not extend to 
tribal commercial activities. On the contrary, the current congressional 
policy toward Indian tribes promotes tribal self-determination and 
recognizes that economic development is essential to this aim.83 
79. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138,2004 WL 1283584, at *2 (May 28, 
2004) ("This case requires the board to accommodate Federal labor policy and Federal Indian 
policy in deciding whether to assert jurisdiction, under the Act, over tribal enterprises."); id. at *7 
("Having determined that the Act does not preclude the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over the 
Respondent, we next address whether Federal Indian policy requires that the Board decline 
jurisdiction."); id. at *12. Further, 
Id. 
[blecause application of the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene standard poses no impediment 
to the assertion of the Board's jurisdiction, the final step in the Board's analysis is to 
determine whether policy considerations militate in favor of or against the assertion of 
the Board's discretionary jurisdiction. Our purpose in undertaking this additional 
analytical step is to balance the Board's interest in effectuating the policies of the Act 
with its desire to accommodate the unique status of Indians in our society and legal 
culture. 
80. See id. 
8!. Id. at *8. 
82. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 123-24 (1960) 
(finding that tribally-owned fee lands were subject to condemnation under the Federal Power Act); 
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that OSHA 
applied to a tribally-owned farm). 
83. For example, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act states that its purpose is "to provide a 
statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal 
economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments." 25 U.S.c. §2702(1) 
(2000). The Indian Financing Act of 1974 states, 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress ... to help develop and utilize Indian 
resources, both physical and human, to a point where the Indians will fully exercise 
responsibility for the utilization and management of their own resources and where 
they will enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts comparable to 
that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities. 
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Ultimately, the Board's failure to recognize the foundational principles 
of federal Indian law and its failure to apply the Indian canon of statutory 
construction led it to adopt an analysis that is unhinged from a full under-
standing of the place of Indian tribes in the federal system and the trust 
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes. The Board's 
analysis, which consists of the adoption of the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene 
approach and the determination that the approach does not preclude the 
Board's assertion of jurisdiction over San Manuel's gaming operation, 
trivializes sovereignty, as dissenting Board member Peter Schaumber aptly 
described. 84 
What follows is a review of the problems inherent in the Board's 
application of Tuscarora and Coeur d'Alene. Also discussed is why this 
rule represents the turning of federal Indian law on its head because it 
replaces the foundational principles of federal Indian law with the 
understanding that the true hallmark of federal Indian law is the concept of 
implicit divestiture.85 Finally, if the federal courts continue to apply this 
approach, they will progressively confine the concept of tribal sovereignty 
to a narrow, meaningless scope. 
B. THE BOARD'S MISGUIDED RELIANCE ON THE "TUSCARORA-COEUR 
D'ALENE ApPROACH" 
1. Reliance on Tuscarora's Dictum 
In its analysis, the Board's decision follows the misguided lead of five 
courts of appeals which have held that Federal Power Commission v. 
Tuscarora Indian Nation86 is the seminal case on whether statutes of 
general application apply to Indian tribes.87 In reality, the language relied 
Id. § 1451. The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, and the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, have similar purposes. Id. § 450, Id. § 461. 
84. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at * 19 (May 
28,2004). 
85. See infra notes 144 to 153 and accompanying text. 
86. 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
87. Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying 
Tuscarora to conclude that OSHA governed a tribal construction company); EEOC v. Fond du 
Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Tuscarora's 
general rule but finding that the ADEA did not apply because it would interfere with the tribe's 
right of self-government); Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 
1985) (applying Tuscarora in opinion concluding that OSHA governed activities of tribally-
owned farm); Fla. Paraplegic, Assoc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 
(I Ith Cir. 1999) (applying Tuscarora to find that Title III of the ADA applies to· Indian tribes); 
Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162, 165 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961) 
(applying Tuscarora to conclude that the NLRA is applicable to a non-Indian uranium mill on the 
Navajo reservation). In Smart v. State Farm Insurance Co., the Seventh Circuit applied 
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upon in Tuscarora consists of decontextualized dictum which the federal 
courts have seized as justification for a massive effort to minimize tribal 
sovereignty. 
The question before the Supreme Court in the Tuscarora case dealt 
with whether fee lands owned by the Tuscarora Nation could be condemned 
under the FPA to make way for a storage reservoir for a power project.88 
The FPA permitted the taking of land generally, but excepted lands 
constituting "reservations" where the taking would "interfere with or be 
inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or 
acquired."89 The Court found that the Tuscarora Nation's fee lands were 
not "reservations" because they did not meet the NLRA's definition, which 
required that the lands be owned by the United States.90 
Upon finding that the FPA did not exempt the fee lands on its face, the 
Court considered whether the taking of the lands violated the long-standing 
principle that "General Acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, unless so 
expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them."91 The Court 
considered the fact that its own more recent precedent had determined that a 
tax law applicable to persons generally is also applicable to individual 
Indians.92 As a result, the Court decided to apply the FPA to the Indian-
owned fee lands, stating "it is now well settled by many decisions of this 
Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians 
and their property interests."93 
Numerous federal courts and commentators have criticized 
Tuscarora's dictum.94 Many criticize the Court's adoption of the dictum as 
Tuscarora to find that ERISA governed a group policy provided to a tribal employer. Smart v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 938 (7th Cir. 1989). But four years later, in Reich v. Great 
Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission, the Seventh Circuit's Judge Posner ignored Tuscarora 
and applied principles of comity and the Indian canon of construction to find that the FLSA did 
not apply to the Commission. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4 F.3d 490 
(7th Cir. 1993). 
88. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99,100 (1960). 
89. Id. at 107-11 (quoting 16 U.s.c. 797(e) (2001». 
90. Id. at 110-14. 
91. Id. at 115-16 (quoting Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94,99-100 (1884». 
92. Id. at 116 (citing Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Comm'r, 295 U.S. 418 
(1935); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943». 
93. Id. 
94. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 266 F.3d 1186, 1199 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Reich v. 
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 
F.2d 937, 938 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989); Multimedia Games, Inc. v. WLGC Acquisition Corp., 214 F. 
Supp. 2d 1131, 1135-36 (N.D. Okla. 2001); see also COHEN, supra note 47, at 284; Vicki J. 
Limas, Application of Federal Labor & Employment Statutes to Native American Tribes: 
Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 681,696-99 (1994); Alex 
Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of General Application to Indian Tribes and 
Reservation Indians, 25 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 105-07 (1991); Maureen M. Crough, Comment, 
A Proposal for the Extension of the Occupational Safety and Health Act to Indian-Owned 
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a general rule because the case did not involve the potential impairment of 
tribal sovereignty.95 Since the case dealt with an attempt to condemn fee 
lands rather than reservation lands, its holding is relevant for the rights of 
Indians as individuals rather than as governments. There is no evidence 
that the Tuscarora Nation raised, nor did the Court consider, whether the 
FPA would apply if it impaired the self-governance rights of the Tuscarora 
Nation.96 
Ironically, in a discussion about whether a statutory restraint on 
alienation of Indian lands operates to prevent the federal government from 
making conveyances without a treaty or convention as required by the 
statute, the Tuscarora Court identified the test for determining whether a 
statute validly impairs rights of self-government.97 It explained that 
"[t]here is an old and well-known rule that statutes which in general terms 
divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign 
without express words to that effect."98 It is conceivable that the Court 
would have relied on this rule had the case dealt with tribal sovereignty 
rights. Nineteen years earlier, the Court had spoken out against the implied 
diminishment of Indian rights, citing the Indian canon against implied 
repeals.99 The Court stated that "[a]n extinguishment cannot be lightly 
implied in view of the avowed solicitude of the Federal Government for the 
welfare of its Indian wards."loo Two years earlier, this principle was 
reaffirmed in Williams v. Lee.101 In addition, the Supreme Court's rulings 
Businesses on Reservations, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM., 473,486-87 (1985); Judith Royster & 
Rory SnowArrow Faussett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal 
Delegation and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581, 591 (1989). 
95. See Pueblo of San Juan, 266 F.3d at 1199 ("The Tuscarora Court's remarks concerning 
statutes of general applicability were made in the context of property rights, and do not constitute 
a holding as to tribal sovereign authority to govern."); Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 2, at 1393 
("The Tuscarora rule of general applicability does not address tribal self-governance and tribal 
sovereign immunity because those issues were not involved in the formation of the rule."); 
Crough, 'supra note 94, at 486-87 ("The Tuscarora rule's expansive reading of the original case's 
dictum is unjustified because tribal sovereignty was not at issue in the cases on which the dictum 
is based .... "); Royster & SnowArrow, supra note 94, at 591. 
96. In support of its statement on statutes of general application, the Court also relied on case 
law that dealt with the rights of individual Indians. See Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes, 
295 U.S. at 421 (applying federal income taxes to individual Indians); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 
319 U.S. at 612 (applying state taxes to individual Indians). 
97. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960) (quoting 
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1947». 
98. Id. 
99. Blurton, supra note 68, at 43-44 (quoting United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 
U.S. 339 (1941». 
100. Id. 
101. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221 (1958) (concluding that a clear statement of 
congressional intent was necessary to allow state civil or criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian 
reservation activity). 
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after Tuscarora belie the proposition that the case introduced a new rule 
that allowed congressional silence to effectively diminish tribal sovereignty. 
In Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States,102 the Court cautioned that 
federal statutes should not be used as a "backhanded way of abrogating ... 
rights of these Indians."103 In the case of United States v. Wheeler,l04 the 
Court clarified how the rule against implied repeals of tribal rights coexists 
with the principle first expressed in Johnson v. McIntosh that Indian tribes 
lost their complete sovereignty upon discovery. !Os The Court explained, 
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and 
limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and 
is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the 
tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes 
still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty 
or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their 
dependent status. 106 
As Wheeler makes clear, the sovereign rights of tribes in the modem era 
may be diminished by implication only to the extent necessary as a result of 
their dependent status.107 In all other cases, Congress must clearly act to 
limit tribal rightS. I08 This rule, though providing for some limited implied 
repeal of tribal rights, is still significantly more protective of tribal rights 
than the dictum of Tuscarora. 
Others criticize the elevation of Tuscarora's dictum into a general rule 
for statutory construction because the statute involved was arguably not a 
statute of general applicability itself.Hl9 Unlike a statute of general 
applicability which is silent regarding tribes, the FPA had specific 
provisions to accommodate tribal rights.1 10 The statute provided that if the 
lands sought to be taken were part of a "reservation," then the lands could 
not be condemned unless the Federal Power Commission determined that 
the taking would not interfere with or be inconsistent with the purpose for 
102. 391 U.S. 404 (1968). 
103. Blurton, supra note 68, at 44 (quoting Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 
391 U.S. 404 (1968». 
104. 435 U.S. 313 (1977). 
105. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 
106. [d. at 323 (emphasis added). 
107. See infra notes 144-153 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of tribal rights 
and implicit divestiture. 
108. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1942) (Univ. of New 
Mexico Press 1971). 
109. Skibine, supra note 94, at 104-05 ("Tuscarora involved neither Indians within an Indian 
reservation nor a general law that was silent with respect to its application to Indians."); Limas, 
supra note 94, at 698. 
110. 16 U.S.c. §§ 796(2), 797(e) (2000). 
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which the reservation was created.!11 Since the FPA squarely dealt with 
tribal rights and was not a true statute of general application, its dictum on 
statutes of general application lacks salience. 
2. Reliance on Coeur d'Alene's Synthesis 
A further mistake of the Board in San Manuel is its reliance on 
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm l12 as the federal courts' best 
attempt to create a coherent framework from several lines of authority on 
the applicability of general federal statutes to Indian tribes. In Coeur 
d' Alene, the Ninth Circuit accepted the statement in Tuscarora that it is 
"now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in 
terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests," 
but it identified three specific exceptions. 113 The first provides that statutes 
of general application which are silent regarding tribes will not apply if "the 
law touches 'exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural 
affairs. '" 114 The second provides that the statute will not apply if "the 
application of the law to the tribe would 'abrogate rights guaranteed by 
Indian treaties. "'115 The third prevents application if "there is proof by 
legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not 
to apply to Indians on their reservations .... " 116 The court held that when 
any of these three situations are met, "Congress must expressly apply a 
statute to Indians before we will hold that it reaches them."117 
By affirming Tuscarora's rule and asserting that deviations from it 
constitute exceptions rather than proof of its invalidity, Coeur d'Alene 
establishes a rebuttable presumption stacked against tribal interests. 
Although the presumption involves instances where a statute should not 
apply, it still places the burden on tribal parties to prove that their conduct 
fits an exception. The presumption also leads to the inference, adopted by 
many courts, that the exceptions must be narrowly interpreted to prevent 
them from "swallowing the rule."118 Since the Tuscarora dictum did not 
arise from a reasoned analysis that addressed tribal self-governance, and 
III. Id. 
112. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). 
113. Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115-16. 
114. Id. at 1116 (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890,893-94 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. IIII (1981) (finding that the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 applied to 
prohibit individual Puyallup tribal members from operating a casino on tribal lands)). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id.; Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 1996); Smart v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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since it does not articulate a rule that comports with Supreme Court 
precedent establishing the Indian canon of construction, Coeur d'Alene is 
wrong to establish Tuscarora as a hurdle that tribes must overcome. 
A second problem inherent in Coeur d'Alene's analysis is its attempt to 
cabin the exceptions to Tuscarora to only three examples. The exceptions 
identified in Coeur d'Alene, adopted from the Ninth Circuit's opinion in 
United States v. Farris, merely constituted precedents that appeared to 
deviate from Tuscarora's dictum.l 19 Neither the Farris court nor any of its 
authorities claimed that the universe of possible exceptions to Tuscarora 
had been exhausted. Given time, the courts may have identified new 
examples of deviances from Tuscarora, or they may have formed a more 
coherent analysis that provided a more unified approach. 
a. The First Exception: When the Law Touches on "Exclusive 
Rights of Self-Governance in Purely Intramural Matters" 
Coeur d'Alene provides that Tuscarora does not apply when "the law 
touches on 'exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural 
matters."'120 This standard has been widely criticized as subjective, 
trivializing tribal sovereignty, ignorant of tribal government institutions, 
and inconsistent with the Supreme Court's authority on the powers of tribal 
self-govemment. 121 
l. The First Exception Lacks a Rational Tie to Supreme 
Court Precedent 
First, the standard for Coeur d'Alene's first exception forms an 
inappropriate test because it departs from the Supreme Court's case law on 
tribal political authority and from congressional policy in Indian affairs. 
The principle cases that the Farris court relied upon in forming this 
standard were the Supreme Court's opinion in Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez 122 and the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Arizona ex rei. Merrill v. 
Turtle.l 23 Neither of these cases stood for the proposition that Indian tribes 
are generally subject to federal statutes of general application outside 
119. Donovan v. Coeur d' Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting 
United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
120. [d. 
121. E.g., Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 2, at 1392-96; Limas, supra note 94, at 740-46; 
Skibine, supra note 94, at 139. 
122. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
123. 413 F.2d 683 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970). 
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"exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters."124 In 
Martinez, the Supreme Court considered whether the sovereign immunity 
of the Santa Clara Pueblo barred a female member from suing it under the 
Indian Civil Rights Act. 125 In its analysis, the Court examined the nature of 
tribal political authority.126 It explained, 
Indian tribes are "distinct, independent political communities, 
retaining their original natural rights" in matters of local self-
government. . .. Although no longer possessed of the full 
attributes of sovereignty, they remain a "separate people, with the 
power of regulating their internal and social relations." ... They 
have the power to make their own substantive law in internal 
matters and to enforce that law in their own forums.l 27 
The Court's description of tribal sovereignty in Martinez compiled 
statements made in earlier Supreme Court opinions, such as Worcester v. 
Georgia and United States v. Wheeler.l 28 The inclusion of this language in 
the opinion affirmed the Santa Clara Pueblo's authority to interpret the 
Indian Civil Rights Act in its own forum and in accordance with its own 
interpretative powers and cultural values. The Court used this language to 
justify its decision to respect tribal sovereignty and bar a tribal member 
from suing the tribe in federal court. Accordingly, this language is merely a 
positive assertion of the tribe's legal authority. The attempt by the Farris 
court and Coeur d'Alene court to mold this language into a restrictive 
description of the boundaries of tribal political authority is unjustified. 
Other than a recognition later in the opinion that Congress has the plenary 
power to limit or modify the power of self-government, including the power 
to waive tribal sovereign immunity through an "unequivocal expression" of 
"legislative intent," Martinez' description of tribal authority does not mark 
the boundaries of tribal sovereignty in an attempt to encapsulate a defined 
safe zone beyond which general federal statutes can freely effect implied 
repeals of sovereign rights. 
Furthermore, the precise language of the Martinez decision differs from 
the Farris and Coeur d'Alene decisions in a small, yet important respect: 
whereas Martinez provided a positive affirmation of tribes' authority to 
regulate "their internal and social relations,"129 Farris and Coeur d'Alene 
124. Donovan v. Coeur d' Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting 
United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980». 
125. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 51-52. 
126. [d. at 55-56. 
127. Id. (omitting internal citations). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 55. 
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delimited the scope of conduct which is immune from statutes of general 
application that are silent as to tribes to "purely intramural matters. "130 
Assuming that "internal" and "social" have separate meanings, Martinez' 
reference to the tribal power to regulate "social relations" affirmed some 
form of tribal authority beyond internal matters to include dealings with 
nonmembers. Yet neither Farris nor Coeur d'Alene acknowledged this 
"social" element of tribal political authority over external relations. Thus, 
Coeur d'Alene's description truncates the meaning of Martinez to create the 
foundation for a hyper-limited standard for tribal sovereignty. To the extent 
the Coeur d'Alene court carves out an exception from Tuscarora for 
"exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters," the 
Court departs from the very case law that it identifies as its support.131 
The Farris and Coeur d'Alene decisions also limit the potential 
meaning of the first exception to Tuscarora by repeating the mantra that 
tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations are the hall-
marks of the sort of tribal conduct that is presumed to be governed 
exclusively by the tribe unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to abro-
gate tribal sovereign rights)32 These examples are lifted from Martinez, 
which offered them as three examples of tribal authority to make sub-
stantive law)33 Like the three exceptions to Tuscarora, the examples of 
tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations did not exhaust 
the potential matters of tribal self-government. Yet their inclusion as apt 
examples has served as a gatekeeper, decreasing the possibility that tribes 
will successfully argue for a more expansive interpretation of the sort of 
conduct which is presumed exempt from general statutes that are silent as to 
tribes)34 
The Farris court also relied upon the Ninth Circuit's opinion in 
Arizona ex rei. Merrill v. Turtle to support its articulation of the first 
130. United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980); Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene 
Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985). 
131. See id. 
132. Farris,624 F.2d at 893 (citing as examples Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 
(1978) (membership); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899) (inheritance rules); United States v. 
Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916) (domestic relations»; Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 ("We believe 
that the tribal self-government exception is designed to except purely intramural matters such as 
conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations from the general rule 
that otherwise applicable federal statutes apply to Indian tribes."). 
133. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55-56. 
134. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138, 2004 WL 1283584, at *9 (May 
28, 2004) ("Intramural matters generally involve topics such as 'tribal membership, inheritance 
rules, and domestic relations"'); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 
1996) (same). 
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exception to Tuscarora. 135 However, this opinion, like Martinez, is a 
positive affirmation of tribal self-government. The case affirmed that 
Arizona had no authority to extradite a Cheyenne resident of the Navajo 
reservation. 136 The case cites Williams v. Lee's statement that 
"[e]ssentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always 
been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to 
make their own laws and be ruled by them."137 In sum, the Merrill case 
does not serve as a proper description of the outer limits of tribal authority. 
Assuming Tuscarora's blanket statement that general statutes apply to 
Indians and their property interests was valid, a more legally consistent 
description of the exception for tribal self-government would track the 
Supreme Court's doctrine of implicit divestment. Since application of the 
first exception to the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene rule requires consideration 
of the boundary between the zone of tribal conduct where federal 
enactments are not presumed to apply and the zone of conduct where they 
are, it makes more sense to draw from a doctrine that addresses the implied 
limits of tribal powers to exercise self-government. 
The Supreme Court began its fixation with implicit divestiture in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,138 when it concluded that Indian tribes 
no longer retain criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, despite the absence 
of any congressional act or treaty supporting its finding. 139 The Court 
stated that " ... Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those 
powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and 
those powers 'inconsistent with their status. "'140 Two weeks later, the 
Court decided United States v. Wheeler, in which it held that tribal 
prosecutions of members do not violate the double jeopardy clause because 
the power to prosecute such crimes is inherent rather than derived from the 
federal government. 141 In support of its conclusion that the sovereign 
power to prosecute was not implicitly lost, the Court stated that "[t]he areas 
in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have 
occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and 
nonmembers of the tribe."142 As a result, the Court explained, the Court 
135. Farris, 624 F.2d at 893 (citing Arizona ex rei. Merril v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 685 
(1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970)) . 
136. Merrill, 413 F.2d at 685. 
137. Id. at 684 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). 
138. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
139. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208. 
140. [d. 
141. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,332-33 (1978). 
142. [d. at 326. 
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had long recognized that tribes no longer have the power to freely alienate 
lands to non-Indians, they can no longer enter into direct relations with 
foreign nations, and they can no longer try nonmembers in tribal courts.143 
In 1981, the Supreme Court revisited the doctrine of implicit 
divestiture in Montana v. United States.144 That case concluded that tribes 
generally lack the authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians 
on non-Indian owned fee lands within a reservation.l45 It stated that the 
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the 
dependent status of tribes, and so cannot survive without express con-
gressional delegation."I46 The Court, however, identified two exceptions to 
its rule.147 A tribe may regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, and a tribe may 
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands when 
the conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, 
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."148 
Following Montana, the Court decided a series of cases that narrowly 
interpreted the Montana exceptions. 149 The Court has also extended 
Montana's analysis to tribal lands as well as non-Indian fee lands. 15o The 
cumulative effect of these decisions is that tribal civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers is limited to instances where the tribal interest is extremely 
high or where the exercise of civil jurisdiction is rationally related to a 
private consensual relationship between the tribe and nonmember.1 51 
The Court's development of implicit divestiture shows that the limits of 
tribal political authority are drawn where tribal relations with nonmembers 
143. Id. 
144. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
145. Montana,450 U.S. at 544. 
146. Id. at 564. 
147. Id. at 565-66. 
148. Id. 
149. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) 
(rejecting tribal authority to zone all non-Indian lands within a reservation); Strate v. A-I 
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (rejecting tribal civil jurisdiction over car accidents that take 
place on state-owned lands within a reservation); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 
(2001) (rejecting tribal authority to tax non-Indian owners of land within a reservation); Nevada v. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (rejecting tribal civil jurisdiction over a state officer who enters tribal 
land to enforce a search warrant). 
150. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364-65. 
151. Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal 
Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 652 (2003) ("The exception in Montana for economic 
interests and political integrity has been interpreted exceedingly narrowly."); Atkinson Trading 
Co., 532 U.S. at 656 (stating that Montana's consensual relationship exception requires that the 
tribal regulation have a nexus to the consensual relationship); Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359 n.3 
(interpreting the Montana reference to consensual relationships as private and not far removed). 
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are concerned. It would be wrong to conclude that tribes lack the power of 
self-government in all matters involving nonmembers, however. The 
Montana Court's two exceptions were founded on a long history of the 
recognition of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. 152 This history, as 
synthesized by Montana, creates a more appropriate substitute for Coeur 
d' Alene's first exception to Tuscarora. The exception should therefore 
provide that the Tuscarora presumption should never apply if the 
application of the federal statute in question would interfere with the tribe's 
self-government powers in internal matters. It should also provide that the 
Tuscarora presumption should not apply if the application of the federal 
statute in question would interfere with the tribe's self-government in 
matters where it is exercising civil jurisdiction over nonmembers who are 
engaged in conduct that threatens the tribe's political integrity, economic 
security, or health or welfare, or who have formed a consensual relationship 
with the tribe, and the nature of the consensual relationship is connected to 
the exercise of jurisdiction. Under this standard, general federal labor laws 
that are silent with respect to tribes should not presumptively apply in the 
tribal context. This is because all tribal employment consists of a 
consensual relationship between the tribal employer and employee, and the 
tribal regulation of employment matters is directly connected to this 
relationship. 
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's first exception to the Tuscarora dictum is 
not consistent with the Supreme Court's federal Indian law jurisprudence. 
Rather than using Supreme Court precedent that describes the outer limits 
of tribal political authority over non-members, the Coeur d'Alene and 
Farris courts established a sui generis standard that diverges from 
precedent and places artificial limits on tribal authority. 
ii. The First Exception Invites Subjectivism 
The first exception to Coeur d'Alene, which forces the court to 
determine whether a law touches "exclusive rights of self-governance in 
purely intramural matters," also invites an extreme form of subjective 
jurisprudence.l53 The case law currently available on this question is 
sparse, relative to the large potential for the application of this standard to 
myriad unique tribal circumstances. As a result, the courts lack objective 
tests that adequately address how to resolve disputes under this prong. 
Currently, the tests that the federal courts and the NLRB have fashioned are 
152. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
153. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 at 116 (citing U.S. v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 
893-94 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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either so limiting that they barely permit an exception to arise, or they are 
so loosely defined that they fail to create a standard at all. The risk with 
courts that interpret the test in an overly restrictive way is that they create 
an insurmountable hurdle to the exercise of tribal sovereignty. For exam-
ple, the Ninth Circuit applies this standard by looking to whether the 
conduct in question is one of "those rare circumstances where the 
immediate ramifications of the conduct are felt primarily within the 
reservation by members of the tribe and where self-government is clearly 
implicated."I54 Under this interpretation, any conduct that affects interstate 
commerce or involves the employment of non-Indians is not deemed to 
constitute a purely intramural matter or implicate tribal self-government. 155 
Alternatively, tests that fail to create an objective standard invite subjective 
determinations that increase the opportunity for courts to impose their own 
normative constructs onto tribes, forcing tribes to conform to the court's 
vision of legitimate tribal self-government. The ambiguity inherent in this 
exception to Tuscarora is most evident with the requirement that a general 
statute touch "exclusive rights of self-governance."ls6 The opinions that 
apply this standard have failed to interpret the meaning of this phrase, and 
have instead made conclusory statements that the tribal operation of 
businesses affecting interstate commerce are not essential to tribal self-
government. IS? 
In addition, if a tribal interest argues that the first exception applies, the 
rebuttable presumption forces the tribal party to place the legitimacy of 
tribal sovereignty on trial for a federal decision maker's review. As tribes 
and other tribal interests attempt to show that the application of the law 
would touch "exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural 
matters," they are forced to submit the legitimacy of tribal governance to a 
largely homogenous pool of non-Indians at the bench.lS8 Since many 
154. Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2004). 
155. See id., NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995, 999-1000 (9th 
Cir. 2003); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1996); U.S. Dept. 
of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 935 F.3d 182, 184 (9th Cir. 1991); 
Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe ofindians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1129 (1 Ith Cir. 
1999). 
156. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 at 116 (citing U.S. v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 
893-94 (9th Cir. 1980). 
157. See, e.g., Fla Paraplegic Ass'n, 166 F.3d at 1129. 
158. For example, in the San Manuel decision, the Board stated, 
[w]hen the Indian tribes [participate in the national economy in commercial 
enterprises] the special attributes of their sovereignty are not implicated .... 
[However,] at times, the tribes continue to act in a manner consistent with that mantle 
of uniqueness. They do so primarily when they are fulfilling traditionally tribal or 
governmental functions that are unique to their status as Indian tribes. 
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judges and other tribunals such as the NLRB lack familiarity with tribal law 
and tribal institutions of self-government, these arbiters are poorly equipped 
to recognize when conduct in Indian Country implicates tribal self-
government interests. 159 
iii. The First Exception Minimizes Sovereignty 
The Board's use of the "exclusive rights of self-government in purely 
intramural affairs" standard is also inappropriate because it minimizes and 
trivializes tribal sovereignty. First, the "purely intramural" standard led the 
Board to express doubt that tribal sovereignty is at stake when the San 
Manuel Band engages in conduct involving non-Indians. As discussed 
above, this presumption is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinions 
on the scope of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.l60 Particularly in cases 
involving consensual relationships with nonmembers, the Supreme Court 
recognizes that tribes possess civil jurisdiction to regulate the conduct of 
non-members as long as the regulation has a nexus with the nature of the 
consensual relationship.l61 The right to enact and enforce laws governing 
the employment relationship satisfies this nexus requirement, since the laws 
directly relate to the consensual employment relationship between tribal 
employers and employees. Similarly, tribes possess jurisdiction to enforce 
tribal employment laws against a non-Indian company employing non-
Indians on the reservation, provided that the tribe or its members enter into 
a consensual commercial agreement relating to employment. The existence 
of tribal authority to regulate the employment relationship in these 
circumstances underscores the fact that these relationships implicate tribal 
self-government interests. 
The Board's application of the "purely intramural" standard is also 
troubling because it conceives of tribes as isolated units comprised 
exclusively of members. In reality, non-members participate in nearly all 
aspects of tribal life.l62 They work as employees in both tribal business 
San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 138,2004 WL 1283584, at *8 (May 28,2004). 
The Board did not explain how it might identify when a tribe fulfills its traditional tribal or 
governmental functions. 
159. Getches, supra note 52, at 276 ("Judges who are not steeped in the culture and values of 
Indian tribalism are ill-equipped to rework these complex and anomalous traditions case by 
case.") 
160. See supra note 137 and text accompanying. 
161. See Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001). 
162. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact 
of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 L. & Soc. REV. 1123, 1128 (1994). 
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enterprises and tribal government,!63 They live in tribal housing with their 
enrolled spouses, parents, or children.!64 They participate in tribal com-
merce, stay as guests in tribal hotels, and travel through tribal lands.!65 In 
addition, in many tribes, non-members participate in tribal government by 
serving as members of tribal boards, commissions, and judiciaries.!66 If 
more courts require the exclusive involvement of tribal members before 
finding that tribal conduct is "purely intramural," the standard will rarely, if 
ever, apply. 
Second, the San Manuel decision expresses doubt that tribal 
sovereignty rights are involved when a tribe operates a commercial 
enterprise. The Board's perfunctory dismissal of the notion that com-
mercial activities involve issues of sovereignty disregards the economic 
reality of tribes, the tribal governance issues involved in commercial 
conduct, and the prevailing congressional policy of the day. 
It is widely recognized that Indian tribes are one of the most 
impoverished groups in the country.!67 In August 2004, the Census Bureau 
reported that the poverty rate for American Indians is nearly double the 
national average.!68 Tribal communities also suffer from high unemploy-
ment rates, high rates of insufficient and substandard housing, high suicide 
rates, high rates of diabetes, and low rates of educational achievement,!69 A 
significant factor contributing to these statistics is the absence of healthy 
economies on many tribal reservations)7o Due to remoteness and lack of 
economic development, many tribes lack a tax base to sufficiently pay for 
needed governmental services.!7! Furthermore, reliance on federal funding 
without independent sources of governmental revenues serves to prolong 
163. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Employment Separation: Tribal Law 
Enigma. Tribal Governance Paradox. and Tribal Court Conundrum, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
(forthcoming 2005). 
164. See Matthew L.M. Retcher, United States v. Lara: Affirmation of Tribal Criminal 
Jurisdiction Over Nonmember American Indians, 83 MICH. B. 1., July 2004, at 24, 25. 
165. E.g., Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Scott, 117 F.3d 1 \07 (9th Cir. 1997). 
166. E.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, Grand Traverse Band 
Police Commission Ordinance (Jan. 11, 2000); Swinomish Tribe, Utilities Code, Tribal Utility 
Authority Membership, 11-02.070 (Nov. 5, 2003); The Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde 
Community of Oregon, Tribal Court Ordinance, Tribal Code § 3 \O(e) (March 5, 2003). 
167. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL, U.S CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003 12 (Aug. 2004), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf. 
168. See id. 
169. See generally Fiscal 2006 Budget: Indian Affairs-Part 2, Before the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs, 2005 WL 375968 (Feb. 15, 2005) (statement of Tex Hall, President 
National Congress of American Indians). 
170. See id. 
171. See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300, 1315 n.21 (D.D.C. 1987). 
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economic dependence and stagnation. 172 Consequently, tribal involvement 
in commercial activities is an essential governmental function for many 
tribes. 
The revenues produced by tribal businesses fund services as diverse as 
utilities, including water, sewer, telecommunications and energy; health 
care; natural resource management; elders programs; social services; tribal 
court systems; law enforcement; tribal schools; and adult education. 173 
Some fear that tribal commercial activities such as gaming result in large 
windfalls for a few tribal members,174 However, the reality is that gaming 
is not a cash cow for most tribes, and federal law imposes restrictions on 
gaming revenues to ensure that the funds are used for governmental 
services. 175 
The Board is also wrong to dismiss the notion that tribal commercial 
activities fail to raise issues of self-governance. The Board takes the posi-
tion of several courts of appeals when it demarcates tribal governmental 
activities from tribal commercial activities and presumes that self-
government interests are limited to the first. First, for the reasons discussed 
above, tribal commercial activities are closely linked to governance because 
they play an essential role in funding government services and energizing 
tribal economies. Second, tribal commercial activities necessarily raise 
issues of governance because tribes regulate every aspect of commercial 
activity. Tribes govern the formation and maintenance of corporations, 
commercial transactions, the employment relationship, conduct that affects 
the environment, and land use. 176 Although the Supreme Court has 
recognized restrictions on the extent of tribal civil jurisdiction, these 
restrictions do not entirely prevent tribes from exercising political authority 
over these maUers.177 As a result, tribal commercial activities are tightly 
enmeshed in tribal self-governance decisions. 
172. Cf, ERIC HENSON & JONATHAN B. TAYLOR, NATIVE AMERICA AT THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM, 26-27 (2004) available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/pubs.pub_004.htm. 
173. See. e.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. United States Att'y 
for the W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 924 (W.O. Mich. 2002), aJf'd, 369 F.3d 960 (6th 
CiT. 2004). 
174. See Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice?: How IGRA Shapes the 
Politics of Native American Gaming. Sovereignty. and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOc. POL' Y & L. 381, 
430 (1998). 
175. See 25 U.S.c. § 271O(b)(2)(B). 
176. See generally John F. Petoskey, Doing Business With Michigan Indian Tribes, 76 MICH. 
B. J. 440 (1997). 
177. See. e.g., Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort 
Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding for consideration whether the tribe 
had authority to regulate activities of non-Indian business conducting activities on tribal lands). 
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The Board's determination that tribal commercial activities do not 
invoke sovereignty concerns is also refuted by Congress's policy toward 
tribes.l 78 As discussed above, Congress has expressly adopted a policy of 
furthering tribal self-determination through enacting laws that foster 
economic development. 179 The Indian Financing Act of 1974 and the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act are just two 
examples that "reflect Congress'[s] [sic] desire to promote the 'goal of 
Indian self-government, including the 'overriding goal' of encouraging 
tribal self-sufficiency and economic development."180 
Third, the language "exclusive rights of self-government in purely 
intramural matters" trivializes tribal sovereignty because it lacks objec-
tivity.181 The only guidance that the Coeur d'Alene decision offers on its 
meaning was its statement that membership, inheritance rights, and 
domestic relations are included within its scope. Yet, as discussed earlier, 
these subjects do not represent exhaustive compilations of the tribal 
political authority. Many courts, however, approach their analysis of this 
exception by searching for evidence that the conduct in question is related 
to one of these three subject matters.l82 In these cases, the courts apply the 
exception in an exceedingly minimizing way.183 Courts that do not apply 
this limitation, however, are left without a full sense of the scope of self-
government activities that it might encompass. The result is that courts 
apply their own subjective determinations on a case-by-case basis, deciding 
in each particular factual situation whether the conduct in question appears 
to relate to tribal sovereignty rights. l84 This approach is also inappropriate 
because it invites the courts to determine the essential ingredients of tribal 
sovereignty on an ad hoc, "I know it when I see it" basis. 
178. See, supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
179. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (2000) (declaring policy of Congress to allow Indian tribes 
to develop resources for economic development and self-government purposes). 
180. Vicki 1. Limas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native 
American Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.1. 681,693 
(1994) (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 510 
(1991». 
181. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 at 116 (citing U.S. v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 
893-94 (9th Cir. 1980). 
182. E.g., NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 
2003); EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001); Aa. Paraplegic 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe ofIndians of Aa., 166 F.3d 1126,1129 (11th Cir. 1999); Reich v. 
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 1996); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 
F.2d 929,936 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. White, 237 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2001); U.S. 
Dept. of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n, 935 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir. 1991). 
183. E.g., Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d at 179-82 (applying Occupational Health & 
Safety Act to tribal business); Occupational Safety & Health Comm 'n, 935 F.2d at 184 (applying 
rule to tribal mill even though "revenue from the mill is critical to the tribal government"). 
184. Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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b. The Second Exception Selectively Adopts a Portion of the 
Rule Against Implied Repeals 
Coeur d'Alene also recognizes an exception to Tuscarora's presump-
tion in cases where application of the law would abrogate treaty rights. 
This exception recognizes that "Congress does not intend to abrogate laws 
guaranteed by Indian treaties when it passes general laws, unless it makes 
specific reference to Indians."185 This principle simply restates the Indian 
canon of construction, that the courts "do not construe statutes as 
abrogating treaty rights in a 'backhanded way'; in the absence of explicit 
statement, 'the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty right is not to be 
lightly imputed to the Congress. "'186 
Through the treaty rights exception, Coeur d'Alene and the Board in 
San Manuel adopt the rule against implied repeals. However, both Coeur 
d'Alene and San Manuel fail to recognize that the Supreme Court has 
applied the rule against implied repeals in the absence of treaties as well,l87 
C. THE BOARD'S DENIAL OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Once the Board determined that it could assert jurisdiction over San 
Manuel, it neglected that "[t]he fact that a statute applies to Indian tribes 
does not mean that Congress abrogated tribal immunity in adopting it."188 
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that "whether an Indian tribe is 
subject to a statute and whether the tribe may be sued for violating the 
statute are two entirely different questions."189 Thus, upon concluding that 
the NLRA applied to the San Manuel's gaming operation, the Board was 
required to consider as separate issue whether the tribe's sovereign 
immunity had been waived by Congress or the tribe. 
In general, where the application of a statute will abrogate tribal 
sovereign immunity, such abrogation may not be implied,l90 Rather, it 
must be "unequivocally expressed"191 in "explicit legislation."I92 In the 
recent case of Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, 
185. United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980). 
186. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986) (quoting Menominee Tribe v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 404,413 (1968». 
187. See. e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. 
R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). 
188. Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000). 
189. Aa. Paraplegic Ass'n v. Miccosukee Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126, 1130 (lIth Cir. 1999). 
190. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 435 U.S. 49,58 (1978). 
191. Id. (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969»; see also United States v. 
Testan, 424 U.S. 392,399 (1976). 
192. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,759 (1998). 
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Inc.,193 the Supreme Court upheld the vitality of tribal sovereign immunity 
in off-reservation tribal commercial' activities.l 94 It noted that Congress 
could "alter its limits through explicit legislation."195 But absent a clear 
mandate from Congress, the Supreme Court refused to find that tribal 
immunity was diminished.l96 It noted, "Congress is in a position to weigh 
and accommodate the competing policy concerns and reliance interests. 
The capacity of the Legislative Branch to address the issue by compre-
hensive legislation counsels some caution by us in this area."I97 In the case 
of San Manuel, the Board's assertion of jurisdiction under the NLRA 
created the potential that the tribe would be subject to suit and penalized 
with fines. Such actions, which would abrogate the tribe's sovereign 
immunity, require a clear expression in explicit legislation. Since the 
NLRA includes no such expression, the Board's assertion of jurisdiction 
should be barred. 
III. CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND FOR THE NLRA TO APPLY TO 
TRIBES 
Viewed from the perspective of the foundational principles of federal 
Indian law and the Indian canon of construction, the language of the NLRA 
does not support the conclusion that the NLRA applies to tribes and divests 
them of their sovereign authority to govern tribal labor relations. 
None of the NLRA's provisions specifically refer to tribes. Instead, it 
vests jurisdiction in the NLRB over "employers," and the NLRA excludes 
from the definition of employers "[t]he United States or any wholly owned 
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or 
political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor 
Act ... or any labor organization (other than when acting as an 
employer), ... "198 The Indian canon instructs that "statutes are to be con-
strued liberally in favor of Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted 
to their benefit,"I99 and it requires that congressional abrogations of 
sovereignty be "unmistakably clear."2oo The NLRA lacks an "unmistakably 
clear" intent to abrogate tribal sovereignty. Furthermore, the NLRA's 
193. 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
194. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760. 
195. /d. at 759. 
196. [d. 
197. [d. 
198. 29 U.S.c. § 152(2) (2000). 
199. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985). 
200. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 
258 (1992) ("[O]ur cases reveal a consistent practice of declining to find that Congress has 
authorized state taxation unless it has 'made its intention to do so unmistakably clear. '''). 
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silence regarding tribes does not effectively establish an intent to impinge 
tribal sovereign rights. Rather, statutory silence in interpretive questions 
involving Indian tribes often creates ambiguity.201 In such cases, "the 
correct presumption is that silence does not work a divestiture of tribal 
power. "202 
In addition to the NLRA's language, its legislative history and the 
broader historical context surrounding its passage also provide no support 
for the theory that Congress intended the NLRA to apply to tribes and 
divest them of tribal sovereign powers. The NLRA was enacted by 
Congress in 1935 to encourage collective bargaining and protect the right of 
workers to freedom of association and self-organization.203 The NLRA's 
statement of findings and policy recognizes that "[t]he denial by employers 
of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept 
the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of 
industrial strife or unrest."204 The NLRA also recognizes in its statement of 
findings that the unequal bargaining power between workers and employers 
results in the depressing of wage rates and the purchasing power of wage 
earners.20S The NLRA attempts to rectify these problems by creating a 
statutory basis for the promotion of collective bargaining.206 It pronounces, 
[i]t is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to 
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free 
flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions 
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and pro-
cedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the pur-
pose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment 
or other mutual aid or protection.207 
201. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1993). 
202. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Merrion v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,148 n.14 (1982». 
203. The discussion of the NLRA in this article pertains to the NLRA as it was passed in 
1935. Although the NLRA was subsequently amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-
101,61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 V.S.c. §§ 141-197 (1982», and the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), those 
amendments can be characterized more as minor adjustments than substantial modifications of the 
original law. 
204. 29 V.S.c. § 151 (2000). 
205. [d. 
206. [d. 
207. [d. 
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Its legislative history provides an even fuller sense of the NLRA's purpose. 
This legislative history was largely shaped by Senator Robert F. Wagner of 
New York, the legislator who authored the bill and lobbied passionately for 
its passage.20S Wagner's primary concerns as evidenced in statements 
attributed to him in the Congressional Record were strengthening the 
economy by ensuring that workers could effectively bargain for higher 
wages and limiting incidents of workplace disruption by reducing the 
number and severity of strikes.209 
The impetus to enact the NLRA also developed from a need to prevent 
extreme workplace violence between employers and employees.2\o Senator 
Wagner testified that "[t]his toll of private warfare cannot be measured by 
statistics alone, for it places the taint of hatred and the stain of bloodshed 
across the pathway to amicable and profitable business dealings."211 
Outside the halls of Congress during the consideration of Wagner's bill, 
employers commonly engaged in practices such as spying on unions, 
holding stockpiles of weapons, and employing company police and 
strikebreakers to keep employees in line.212 In some cases, employers 
resorted to hiring private "detective companies" who systematically 
attempted to silence worker dissent through the use of force and even 
murder.213 The passage of the NLRA "shifted the focus of the labor 
conflict away from violent confrontation toward the hearing rooms and 
courts" by offering workers an enforceable mechanism to collectively 
bargain with employers.214 
When Congress enacted the NLRA, employment relations in Indian 
Country were not on its radar. Congress enacted the NLRA to respond to a 
208. Michael 1. Heilman, The National Labor Relations Act at Fifty: Roots Revisited, Heart 
Rediscovered,23 DUQ. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1985). 
209. Id. at 1071-72, 1073-74. 
210. Id. at 1074 (citing 79 CONGo REC. S7573 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner)). 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 1075. 
213. John M. Husband, The Colorado Coal Wars of 1913 and 1914: Some Issues Still 
Debated Today, 26 COLO. LAW. 147, 149 (1997) (quoting WALTER H. FINK, THE LUDLOW 
MASSACRE 75 (1914)). According to contemporary sources, 
Id. 
When the operator saw a strike was inevitable, the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency 
was employed, and hundreds of gunmen and hired assassins, many of whom had 
murdered women and children in the West Virginia strike, were brought into the state. 
More than a dozen machine guns were purchased and a systematic reign of terror that 
has known no equal in history of industrial conflicts was begun by these hired murders 
[sic] of John D. Rockefeller. 
214. E. Christi Cunningham, Identity Markets, 45 How. L.J. 491, 554 n.405, 557 n.430 
(2002) 
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growing labor relations crisis in industrial America.215 At no point did 
Congress affirm that the NLRA would apply to employment relations in 
Indian Country.216 Indeed, no reference was ever made in the NLRA's 
legislative history to tribes or tribal employment.217 
The broader historical context surrounding the NLRA' s passage 
strongly supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend for the NLRA 
to apply to tribal employment relations. Although legislative history is the 
"ultimate source" for determining Congress's purpose in making the law, 
the broader historical context of lawmaking is also instructive to show the 
conditions that motivate Congress's actions.218 
The broader context of the NLRA's passage in July of 1935 included 
the making by Congress of "one of the most significant single pieces of 
legislation directly affecting Indians ever enacted by the Congress of the 
United States."219 This legislation was the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 (IRA), also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act. 220 Enacted in June of 
1934, the IRA effectively reversed the federal government's Indian affairs 
policy by terminating the era of allotment and encouraging greater tribal 
self-govemment.221 
Immediately prior to the enactment of the IRA, Congress attempted to 
implement a policy of allotting tribally-owned lands to individual tribal 
members. This policy was largely implemented t~rough the Dawes General 
215. See Local 1976, United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, A.F.L. v. NLRB, 
357 U.S. 93 (1958); see also Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954) ("The underlying purpose 
of this statute is industrial peace."). 
216. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) (failing to include Indian tribes in the definition of 
"employer"). 
217. See NLRB. v. Pueblo of San Juan, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1354 (D.N.M. 1998) (citing Sac 
& Fox, Indus. Ltd., 307 NLRB 241,242 (1992». 
Id. 
218. See Heilman, supra note 208, at 1063-64, stating, 
The law is born as a response to secular events, and grows in response to them. If this 
were not so we would all still study Blackstone's Commentaries. Congress does not 
act sua sponte; it responds to the conditions of the nation. No statute or legislative 
discussion makes much sense in the abstract, eviscerated of the events that gave rise to 
it. If contemporary economic, social and political events are kept in mind, words on 
yellowed pages can become relevant and vital. Studying a statute while ignoring the 
events of the day is akin to using a skeleton to study anatomy. 
219. Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 
MICH. L. REV. 955, 955 (1972) 
220. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.c. §§ 461-479 (1934). 
221. Id. The allotment era had commenced with the passage of the General Allotment Act of 
1887, ch. 119,24 Stat. 388, codified as amended at 25 U.S.c. §§ 331-358 (1994). The policy of 
allotment was the break up of communal ownership of tribal lands through the assignment of 
allotments, or parcels of land, to individual tribal members. See id. The allotments issued tribal 
members were subject to restrictions on alienation that generally expired after twenty-five years. 
Id. § 348. The policy of allotment resulted in the opening up of tribal lands to non-Indian 
settlement. 
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Allotment Act of 1887.222 The allotment policy had several objectives.223 
It broke up the communally-held tribal land base; encouraged tribal mem-
bers to adopt a sedentary; agricultural life on individually-held parcels; and 
opened tribal lands to non-Indian settlement.224 The overarching aim of the 
allotment era was the forced dissolution of tribes and the assimilation of 
Indians into mainstream society.225 
Ultimately, the Dawes Act and its policy of allotment became widely 
recognized as a terrible failure.226 The Meriam Report of 1928 publicized 
the hardships incurred by the loss of the Indian land base and called for 
reforms in federal Indian policy.227 The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
John Collier, pushed for reforms.228 He envisioned a new era in which 
tribal governments would emerge from pervasive federal control to exercise 
their own self-determination.229 Congress responded by reversing the 
course of federal Indian policy through its enactment of the IRA.230 
In contrast to allotment, the IRA ushered in a new era of tribal self-
governance.231 The legislative history of the IRA indicates that Congress's 
intent in passing it was "to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to 
give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of 
oppression and paternalism. "232 The IRA's first few sections served to 
stabilize and strengthen the tribal land base.233 They prohibited any further 
allotment of reservation land, prevented existing allotments from converting 
to freely-alienable property by extending their existing trust restrictions, 
222. The Dawes General Allotment Act was preceded by several treaties which also sought 
to implement allotment on a case-by-case basis with individual tribes. See Treaty with the 
Omaha, Mar. 16, 1854, 10 Stat. 1043; Treaty with the Shawnee, May 10, 1854, 10 Stat. 1053; 
Treaty with the Sacs and Foxes of Missouri, May 18, 1854, 10 Stat. 1074; Treaty with the 
Kickapoo, May 18, 1854, 10 Stat. 1078, Treaty with the Ottawa and Chippewa, July 31, 1855, II 
Stat. 621. The Act was also followed by statutes such as the Curtis Act, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495 
(June 28, 1898), which forced allotment on the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, Seminoles, 
and Creeks. 
223. See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. L. J. 1,8 (1995). 
224. See id. 
225. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (citing Hearings on H.R. 
7902 before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 428 (1934) (statement of 
D.S. Otis on the history of the allotment policy». 
226. See Royster, supra note 223, at 6. 
227. See generally INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN 
ADMINISTRATION (Lewis Meriam ed. 1928). 
228. See generally Readjustment of Indian Affairs, Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House 
Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). 
229. Id. 
230. 25 U.s.c. §§ 461-479 (1934). 
231. See Singer, supra note 151, at 649-50. 
232. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) (quoting H.R. Rep. 1804, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934». 
233. See Royster, supra note 223, at 17. 
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and generally prohibited future transfers of Indian lands, unless the lands 
were transferred to the tribe itself.234 Sections 16 and 17 of the IRA served 
as the vehicle for the affirmation of tribal self-government.235 Under these 
provisions, the Secretary of Interior was authorized to approve tribal 
constitutions and charters of incorporations for tribes that elected to 
organize under the IRA.236 
Thus, the IRA's enactment represented the denunciation of the 
assimilationist policy of allotment, the adoption of a new policy promoting 
tribal self-government, and an attempt by Congress to comprehensively set 
out in legislation several measures that defined tribal rights. These aspects 
of the IRA serve as an instructive backdrop for interpreting the intent of 
legislation subsequently passed by Congress. The need to interpret other 
federal laws in light of Congress's contemporaneous statements on Indian 
tribes was also underscored by the Supreme Court just three years before 
passage of the IRA in the opinion of Choteau v. Burnet. 237 In that decision, 
the Court addressed whether certain federal tax laws applied to reservation 
Indians,238 The Court opined that since the prevailing Congressional policy 
at the time of the enactment of the tax legislation was the assimilation of 
Indians and the ultimate conferral of United States citizenship upon them, it 
was logical to conclude that the tax was intended to apply.239 
When Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935, it did so on the heels of the 
single-most comprehensive piece of legislation ever passed on the subject 
of Indian tribes. It also acted in the wake of a Supreme Court decision that 
emphasized that laws of general application that were silent regarding 
Indians would be interpreted with reference to the prevailing policy of 
federal Indian law. Since Congress had so recently and comprehensively 
234. 25 U.S.c. §§ 461-462,464 (1934). 
235. [d. §§ 476-477. 
236. See id. Section 17 of the IRA, which provided for the issuance of a charter of 
incorporation to a tribe for business formation, stated, 
Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase, take by gift, 
or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and dispose of property of every 
description, real and personal, including the power to purchase restricted Indian lands 
and to issue in exchange therefore interests in corporate property, and such further 
powers as may be incidental to the conduct of corporate business, not inconsistent 
with law; but no authority shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or lease for a period 
exceeding twenty five years any trust or restricted land included in the limits of the 
reservation. Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or surrendered except by Act 
of Congress. 
/d. § 477 (1996). 
237. Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691, 694 (1931) (finding that whether Indians are exempt 
from the tax "requires a reference to the policy of the government with respect to Indians"). 
238. [d. 
239. [d. 
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spoken on the subject of Indian tribes, the only reasonable conclusion that 
can be made based on the NLRA's failure to encompass tribes within its 
regulatory ambit is that Congress never intended the NLRA to apply. 
IV. LABOR RELATIONS AND THE EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Even if the federal courts and the NLRB continue to find that the 
NLRA applies to the on-reservation commercial activities' of tribes, tribes 
still have strategies available to continue to exercise self-governance over 
tribal labor relations. 
A. RIGHT-TO-WORK ORDINANCES 
One successful example of such self-governance is the passage of 
"right-to-work" ordinances by tribal governments. Several tribes have re-
cently passed such ordinances,240 and more are likely to do so in an attempt 
to lessen the likelihood that employees will form unions in the wake of the 
Board's San Manuel decision. 
Right-to-work laws prohibit unions and employers from entering into 
agreements that require employees to join and maintain membership in 
unions.241 Such agreements are commonly known as union security agree-
ments and employers that are subject to them are referred to as union shops. 
Generally, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA permits the formation of union 
security agreements,242 but Section 14(b) of the NLRA also permits states 
and territories to enact right-to-work laws that prohibit them.243 In states 
that have passed right-to-work laws, employees are entitled to refuse to join 
240. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, Resolution #04-22.1446 
(Nov. 24, 2004), codified at 8 Grand Traverse Band Code § 801 and 18 Grand Traverse Band 
Code § 1701 (on file with author), Blue Lake Rancheria, Ordinance No. 03-03 (June 11,2003) (on 
file with author). See also, NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1191 fn. 4 (10th Cir. 
2002) (en bane) (noting that the Navajo Nation, Crow Tribe and Osage Tribe have enacted right-
to-work ordinances); DAVID KENDRICK, NAT'L iNST. FOR LABOR RELATIONS RESEARCH, RIGHT 
TO WORK STATES CONTINUE TRADITION OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (June 10, 1998) (noting that the 
Seneca-Cayuga Tribe had enacted a right-to-work law), at http://www.nilrr.org/growth.htm. 
241. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1190 n.3; see also 8 Grand Traverse Band 
Code § 801(a)(2) ("No person shall be required, as a condition of employment on GTB lands, 
to ... become or remain a member of a labor organization .... "); 18 Grand Traverse Band Code 
§ 1701(a)(2) (same). 
242. 29 U.S.c. § 158(a)(3) (2000) ("nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the 
United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization ... 
to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following 
the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is 
later ... "). 
243. [d. § 164(b) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution 
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of 
employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State 
or Territorial law.") 
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a union or pay union dues after beginning work, even if the employees in 
the workplace are represented by a union. Thus, right-to-work laws give 
employees the option of acting as free riders, since employees can receive 
the benefit of union representation in collective bargaining while also 
refusing to pay union dues.244 Perhaps as a result of this free rider 
phenomenon, right-to-work laws have been shown to de.crease the 
likelihood that new organizing activity will take place in the workplace,245 
As of 2004, twenty-three states had enacted right-to-work laws.246 
In National Labor Relations Board v. Pueblo of San Juan,247 the Tenth 
Circuit reviewed whether the Pueblo of San Juan had authority to pass a 
right-to-work statute that it had enacted, despite the fact that Section 14(b) 
of the NLRA does not explicitly permit tribes to pass legislation of this 
sort,248 The district court concluded that the tribe did have this authority,249 
On appeal, the Board argued that the Pueblo's right-to-work ordinance was 
preempted by federal law,25o A divided Tenth Circuit panel held that the 
NLRA did not preempt the tribal law251 and an en banc panel of the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed that result, 9-1.252 
The holding of Pueblo of San Juan was also acknowledged without 
dissent by the NLRB. In reaching its holding in San Manuel, the Board 
concluded that Pueblo of San Juan was distinguishable because it did not 
involve a claim of complete exemption from the NLRA.253 As a result, 
both the NLRB and the Tenth Circuit recognize the authority of tribes to 
244. See WILLIAM B. GOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 54 (4th ed. 2004). 
245. DAVID T. ELLWOOD & GLENN A. FINE, THE IMPACT OF RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS ON 
UNION ORGANIZING 32 (Nat'I Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W 11 6, 1983). 
246. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 489 (Peter A. Janus et al. eds., 4th ed., supp. 2004). 
States with right-to-work laws include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming. See 
id. 
247. 280 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2000), aff'd on reh 'g, 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc). 
248. See Pueblo of San Juan, 280 F.3d at 1281. 
249. See id. 
250. See id. at 1282. 
251. See id. at 1286. 
252. See NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186,1200 (10th Cir.). 
253. See San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB No. 138,2004 WL 1283584, at *6 
n.16 ("Moreover, the facts of Pueblo of San Juan are distinguishable. There, the Board sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief to challenge a right-to-work ordinance enacted by the tribe. Here, 
the Respondent seeks to avoid the application of the Act to its commercial activities."). The 
Board's statement in this quote neglects the fact that San Manuel also involved an indirect 
challenge to a tribal ordinance, since the San Manuel had enacted a Tribal Labor Relations 
Ordinance that conflicted with the NLRA. 
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pass right-to-work laws, and the right has not been challenged in any other 
circuit. 
Pueblo of San Juan possesses significance for tribes for two reasons. 
First and most obviously, the opinion creates a window of opportunity for 
tribes to exercise some degree of self-governance in the employment 
relations context. By recognizing that tribes have the prerogative to make 
decisions about whether to permit union shops, the opinion allows tribes to 
take ownership over an important aspect of labor relations. Rather than 
fully relinquishing tribal regulatory control over labor relations to the 
NLRB, the Pueblo of San Juan decision creates a window for tribes to 
assess labor relations needs, weigh policy options and enact and implement 
laws that attempt to resolve those needs. These actions are all part of the 
effective operation of self-governance and part of the means toward 
achieving self-determination as well.254 
Second, the rationale of Pueblo of San Juan is significant because it 
affirms the foundational principles of Indian law,255 it applies the Indian 
canon of construction to its interpretation of the NLRA,256 and it places the 
burden of proving that Congress has abrogated tribal sovereign powers 
squarely on the Board.257 In addition, the court distinguishes Federal 
Power Commission v. Tuscarora on the basis that Tuscarora merely 
involved issues of ownership, and did not involve the divestment of tribal 
sovereign powers.258 The court's analysis ultimately leads it to conclude 
that "Congress'[s] silence as to the tribes can hardly be taken as an affir-
mative divestment of their existing 'general authority, as sovereign[s], to 
control economic activity' on territory within their jurisdictions."259 
B. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR REGULATING TRIBAL LABOR RELATIONS 
The likely outcome of the San Manuel and Pueblo of San Juan 
decisions is that tribes will attempt to minimize the threat of unionization 
by passing right-to-work statutes. Although this strategy allows tribes to 
254. See Pueblo of San Juan, 280 F.3d at 1200 ("The legislative enactment of the Pueblo's 
right-to-work ordinance was also clearly an exercise of sovereign authority over economic 
transactions on the reservation. "). 
255. See id. at 1192 (linking Worcester v. Georgia to the principle that tribes retain their 
existing sovereign powers until Congress acts). 
256. See id. at 1194 ("In the absence of clear evidence of congressional intent, therefore, 
federal law will not be read as stripping tribes of their retained sovereign authority to pass right-
to-work laws and be governed by them."). 
257. See id. at 1190 ("The burden falls on the NLRB and the Union, as plaintiffs attacking 
the exercise of sovereign tribal power, to 'show that it has been modified, conditioned or divested 
by Congressional action"'). 
258. See id. at 1198-99. 
259. See id. at 1198 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,137 (1982». 
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exercise some degree of self-governance over labor relations, this strategy 
is at bottom a reactive and insufficient approach that will thwart the ability 
of tribes to develop more progressive and comprehensive labor policies that 
satisfy the specific needs of tribal communities. 
First, the passage of right-to-work ordinances is insufficient because it 
serves as an inferior substitute for the implementation of comprehensive 
tribal labor policies. Those tribes that pass right-to-work ordinances are 
quite possibly driven by the fear that employees will form unions in the 
wake of the San Manuel decision, and they look to right-to-work ~rdinances 
as a form of insurance against union activity. The problem with this 
approach is that right-to-work ordinances do not insure against unions, but 
merely reduce the likelihood of new organizing activity.260 In addition, the 
passage of a right-to-work ordinance is essentially defensive. Once con-
fronted with the threat of NLRA enforcement, tribes are forced to divert 
their attention away from the pursuit of a vision for community labor 
relations that may in fact embrace unions and promote organizing activity 
but impose restrictions on bargaining tactics where the employer provides 
essential public services.261 
The passage of right-to-work ordinances is also insufficient because it 
permits tribes to be treated like states for the purposes of the power to enact 
right-to-work statutes, but it denies tribes other privileges granted states 
under the law. Most obvious, of course, is the fact that states are exempt 
from the definition of "employer" under the NLRA. If tribal sovereignty 
interests are sufficient to support the authority to enact right-to-work 
statutes, the same sovereignty interests should also support the authority of 
tribes to enact tribal labor laws that govern public employment. 
In addition, tribes should press for the right to assume jurisdiction over 
labor disputes, just as Sections 10 and 14(c)(2) of the NLRA permit states 
to assume such jurisdiction,262 Unions, employees, and employers could all 
260. ELLWOOD & FINE, supra note 245, at 32. 
261. There are many reasons to believe that tribal labor policy would differ in significant 
ways from the standards of the NLRA if tribes had the freedom to legislate in this area. Since 
tribally-owned commercial enterprises provide revenues that fund public services, tribes have an 
interest in maintaining revenue flows and restricting business interruptions. Much like the states 
and the federal government, tribes must ensure that the collective bargaining process does not 
jeopardize the continued provision of essential public services. For this reason, a tribal labor 
policy may include restrictions on the unfettered right to strike or restrictions on the subject 
matters eligible for collective bargaining. 
262. 29 U.S.c. § 160(a) (2000) provides that, 
the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to 
cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining, 
manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominantly local 
in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, 
unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination 
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benefit immensely by tribal assumption of jurisdiction over labor disputes. 
The NLRB averages 747 days-more than two years-to conclude a case 
from the date of the filing of the charge to the decision. 263 For an employee 
wrongfully discharged who must continue to make mortgage and car 
payments, this delay virtually ensures that damages will be paid long after 
the house is foreclosed and the car repossessed.264 Some tribes have 
relatively small dockets and could adjudicate labor disputes in a more 
efficient and streamlined process.265 Where appropriate, tribes could also 
offer parties the option of resolving their disputes in traditional dispute 
resolution forums. Several tribes operate traditional dispute resolution 
forums that have substantial benefits, including greater cultural relevance 
for the parties,266 more efficient processes, and increased success at cooper-
ative problem solving. Such traditional dispute resolution forums pose 
significant advantages in comparison to more adversarial processes that 
tend to polarize and entrench the parties. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Board's decision to apply the NLRA to San 
Manuel's gaming operation rests on an analysis that departs with Supreme 
Court precedent and congressional policy. The Board's decision also per-
petuates a pattern of adoption of the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene approach, 
despite the fact that the approach also departs from existing doctrine. If the 
courts and the Board continue their use of the rule, they will minimize and 
trivialize tribal sovereignty on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis, resulting in the 
slow erosion of recognized tribal rights. The best weapon that tribes can 
deploy in response to this pattern is the continued exercise of sovereign 
powers through the enactment, implementation and enforcement of tribal 
of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this 
subchapter or has received a construction inconsistent therewith. 
Id. § 164(c)(2) (2000) provides that, 
[n]othing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts 
of any State or Territory (including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over 
which the Board declines ... to assert jurisdiction. 
263. See GOULD, supra note 244, at 132. 
264. Id. 
265. Kevin K. Washburn & Chloe Thompson, A Legacy of Public Law 280: Comparing and 
Contrasting Minnesota's New Rule for the Recognition of Tribal Court Judgments with the Recent 
Arizona Rule, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 479, 522 (2004) (contrasting the 50,000 cases on the 
Navajo Nation's docket each year with the small docket of many Minnesota tribes). 
266. Robert F. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the 
Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
235,250-51 (1997). 
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legislation such as right-to-work laws, public employment labor relations 
laws, and procedures for the transfer and assumption of jurisdiction over 
tribal labor disputes. 
